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Historical roots
The architecture of EU Defence Policy is strongly influenced by the historical
conditions preceding its evolution. For more than thirty years, any military role of the
European Communities had been out of the question. The only attempt to achieve
military integration in Europe – the European Defence Community – had failed in
1954. Ultimately, under the conditions of the Cold War, European security could
only be guaranteed by the United States and therefore had to be organized within
an Atlantic framework. This led to a long-lasting split between military and political/
economic integration in Europe. The European Communities remained strictly limited
to the latter, while military integration was exclusively a matter of NATO. When the
new European Union – more than thirty years after the Treaties of Rome – finally
turned to the field of defence policy it was a latecomer. Therefore, any EU defence
policy had to be integrated into the preexisting and highly sophisticated Euro-Atlantic
security structures with NATO in the foreground.
Against this background there were specific objections which made the
establishment of an EU defence policy a highly controversial project: the clear
preference of some Member States, in particular of the UK, for keeping the defence
dimension within the Atlantic Alliance; the undeniable difficulty to give the EU a
defence role without damaging the integrity of NATO and without costly duplications
of NATO’s defence structures; the general unwillingness to give up sovereignty
in military issues; and the neutrality policy of some Member States (at the time:
Ireland). Moreover, it was a fundamental shift from the deeply rooted tradition,
perception and self-conception of the Communities, and then of the EU, as a purely
“civilian power”.
That defence policy, against all odds, found its way into the Maastricht Treaty,
had much to do with rifts within the Atlantic Alliance: European fears as to the
reliability of the American security guarantee and quarrels about burden sharing.
Moreover, there were interests at stake in strengthening the process of European
integration in general. This led to a characteristic mixture of defence based motives
and integration based motives behind EU defence policy.
The further development of EU defence policy can be divided in four stages:
1. Introduction as a set of legal rules in the Maastricht Treaty (1992/93), based on
the WEU as military arm of the EU. This stage remained largely theoretical.
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2. Actual launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),
triggered by the Balkans Crisis and the UK giving up its traditional opposition on
the summit of St. Malo (1998/99). These years of almost revolutionary change
saw the establishment of the EU as a defence player, bypassing the WEU,
building its own politico-military institutions and operational capabilities.
3. Stagnation since about 2005,following the failure of the Constitutional
Treatyand thegreat financial crisis. The Treaty of Lisbon codified the essential
achievements of the ESDP (now: Common Security and Defence Policy, CSDP)
but added little new. Beyond that, CSDP lost political priority and got bogged
down in daily routine and lack of resources.
4. Revival with a number of fresh initiatives – notably the establishment of PESCO
– as an attempt to induce a new dynamic to enhance the European military
capabilities. Early signals for such a new trend can be traced back to the
European Council in December 2013 but it is only since 2017 that genuine
policy steps have been taken in that direction.
Essential features of the CSDP-architecture
Four essential features and elements of the CSDP-architecture mirror the above-
mentioned framework conditions:
• Twofold dimension: CSDP consists of an operational dimension and a
capability dimension. The operational dimension relates to the conduct of
military operations under the auspices of the EU, including the establishment of
the necessary institutional structures. The capability dimension deals with the
development of military capabilities in the armed forces of the Member States
by way of coordinated armaments policy and defence planning mechanisms.
This capability dimension has been an integral part of the ESDP-project since
St. Malo. It has the purpose of providing the EU, in the long run, with a more
capable military instrument, but also of strengthening European defence in
general.
• Scenario crisis management: CSDP, in its operational dimension, has
been designed for international crisis management, not for collective self
defence against a direct armed attack (cf. Art. 42 para 1 TEU with its limitation
to operations outside the EU territory). Although the Treaty of Lisbon has
introduced a collective defence clause (Art. 42 para 7 TEU) this clause
establishes merely a horizontal support obligation between the Member States.
It does not provide for any military role of the EU in this context.
• EU force structure: The EU does not have military forces of its own. CSDP is
based on national armed forces of its Member States, including headquarters.
National contingents are temporarily placed under EU operational control and
made available for EU operations or – on a rotational basis – assigned to EU
military formations (battlegroups). Moreover: There is no legal obligation for
Member States to make such troop contributions. The EU force generation
process is strictly based on voluntary contributions, fully respecting national
sovereignty. These restrictions of the EU force structure are ultimately enshrined
in the rather enigmatic distinction between the common defence policy and a
(yet to be achieved) common defence in Art. 42 para 2 TEU.
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• Co-existence with NATO: CSDP has been designed to complement but
not to replace NATO. Remarkably, the TEU explicitly confirms that CSDP is
compatible with NATO policies and obligations (Art. 42 para 2 TEU). CSDP has
been built on the principles of no de-linking (from the Atlantic Alliance) and no
unnecessary duplications (of NATO structures and capabilities). This includes
the “Berlin plus” option of falling back on NATO command structures (rather
than installing separate EU headquarters) and the harmonization of defence
planning processes. In operational terms, CSDP remains limited to small military
missions; its trademark is civil-military cooperation in crisis management. By
contrast, high intensity military operations and collective self-defence have been
left to NATO. Ultimately, however, both organisations have to draw on the same
single set of forces of their Member States.
Revival
There are, essentially, three reasons for the renewed CSDP-dynamic since 2017:
The erratic stance of US foreign policy under President Trump with its rather hostile
attitude towards NATO; the new confrontation with Russia since the Crimean Crisis
in 2014; and the Brexit which has left CSDP without its main internal opponent.
However, the impact of Brexit is ambivalent because it deprives the EU of a crucial
military contributor. Thus, CSDP gains political momentum but loses military
potential.
While these developments have increased the urgency of the CSDP project, they do
not fundamentally change its underlying conditions. The traditional cornerstones that
CSDP cannot replace NATO and that Member States will not give up their ultimate
sovereignty in military affairs have remained unchallenged so far. Therefore it is very
likely that CSDP will not radically change its face in the near future. Accordingly, the
current new initiatives leave the established features of CSDP intact.
The bulk of the new initiatives – with PESCO at its heart – do not address the
operational dimension of CSDP, i.e. the conduct of military operations. They are
concerned with the capability dimension. In sum, they are a combination of renewed
efforts to engage the notorious capability gap which becomes even more dramatic
after Brexit. To achieve this goal they aim at establishing a system of deeper, more
systematic and more closely monitored cooperation in armaments policy, defence
planning and building efficient force structures. This goes along, in the framework of
PESCO, with a certain legalization of commitments which, formerly, had been purely
political.
A second tendency to be expected is a certain push for more independence from
NATO (Europeanisation). Duplications which have been avoided so far will be no red
lines anymore. A first small step has already been taken by upgrading the so-called
Military Planning and Conduct Capability as strategic headquarters for a (small)
executive military operation.
These are reasonable steps in the right direction. Efforts to tackle the notorious
capability gap of the European armed forces are of primary importance. However,
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the impact of the new initiatives should not be overestimated. Their scope and
ambition, as well as their legally binding force, is limited. Ultimately, everything
depends on the continuous will of the Member States to fill them with life, to invest
more in defence, and to give up some sovereign strongholds. Therefore, grand
labels like a “European Defence Union” are rather misleading. In particular, there
is no “European Army” in sight. For the foreseeable future, there is no return to
the European Defence Community of the 1950s. A more realistic solution is a
cooperative network of national armies, systematically using the concept of pooling
& sharing. This is the path entered by the current initiatives. But for the time being,
they are no more than fragmentary pieces of a puzzle which will require a great deal
of time, efforts and resources if it is ever to be completed.
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